In the multi-server environment, remote user authentication has a very critical issue because it provides the authorization that enables users to access their resource or services. For this reason, numerous remote user authentication schemes have been proposed over recent years. Recently, Lin et al. have shown that the weaknesses of Baruah et al.'s three factors user authentication scheme for multi-server environment, and proposed an enhanced biometric-based remote user authentication scheme. They claimed that their scheme has many security features and can resist various well-known attacks; however, we found that Lin et al.'s scheme is still insecure. In this paper, we demonstrate that Lin et al.'s scheme is vulnerable against the outsider attack and user impersonation attack, and propose a new biometric-based scheme for authentication and key agreement that can be used in the multi-server environment. Lastly, we show that the proposed scheme is more secure and can support the security properties.
Introduction
Since Lamport [1] proposed the first password-based authentication scheme over insecure communications in 1981, password-based authentication schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] have been extensively investigated. Remote user authentication scheme is one of the most convenient authentication schemes for dealing with the transmission of secret data through insecure communication channels. During the last two decades, many researchers have proposed the remote user authentication schemes.
A problem that occurs with respect to password-based authentication schemes, however, is that a server must maintain a verification table of the legitimacy of a remote user; therefore, the server requires additional storage to store the verification table. For this reason, many researchers have proposed a new types of remote user authentication schemes whereby the biological characteristics such as a fingerprint are used. The main advantageous property of the biometrics is uniqueness, leading to the proposal of numerous. In the view of fact that several biometric-based remote user authenticati on schemes using smart card [6] [7] [8] have been proposed.
In 2010, Li and Hwang [9] proposed a remote user authentication scheme which was based on biometric verification, smart card, one-way hash function and nonce for the authentication. However, in 2011, Li et al. [10] have shown that Li and Hwang's scheme does not provide proper authentication and cannot resist man-in-the-middle attack. In 2014, Chuang and Chen [11] proposed a multi-server authenticated key agreement scheme using smart card and biometrics with user anonymity. However, Mishra et al. [12] found that their scheme cannot resist the stolen smart card attack and impersonation attack, and proposed an improved remote user authentication scheme. Unfortunately, Baruah et al. [13] found that Mishra et al.'s scheme also cannot withstand the stolen smart card attack and impersonation attack.
Recently, Lin et al. [14] found that Baruah et al.'s scheme cannot resist the stolen smart card attack, and proposed an enhanced user authentication scheme. In order to overcome these weaknesses, they used the fuzzy extractor technology [15] . However, Lin et al.'s user authentication scheme is still insecure.
In this paper, we demonstrate the security weaknesses of vulnerabilities, we propose a new biometrics-based scheme for authentication and key agreement that can be used in a multi-server environment. In addition, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme provides a strong authentication defense against a number of attacks including the attacks of the original scheme. Lastly, we compare the performance and functionality of the proposed scheme with other related schemes. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 and section 3, we review and analyze, respectively, Lin et al.'s scheme; in Section 4, we propose an improved authentication scheme for multi-server environments; in section 5, we present a security analysis of our scheme; section 6 shows the functional and performance analyses whereby the proposed scheme is compared with previous schemes; and, our conclusion is presented in section 7.
Review of Lin et al.'s scheme
In this section, we review the biometric-based three factors user authentication scheme for multi-server environments by Lin et al. [14] [13] , and proposed an enhanced biometric-based three factor user authentication scheme for multi-server environments using smart card. Lin et al.'s scheme used the fuzzy extractor technique [15] and it consists of four phases: registration, login, authentication, and password change phase which as follows. The notations used in this paper are summarized as Table 1 .
Fuzzy extractor
The fuzzy extractor [15, 16] recovers the original biometric key data for a noisy biometric using public information and . Let      be a finite  -dimensional metric space of biometric data points,    ×  →   a distance function useful for computing the distance between any two points based on the chosen metric, the  bit-length of the output string, and the  error tolerance parameter, where   is the set of all positive integers. Definition 1. The fuzzy extractor is a tuple ,  , , which is composed of the following two algorithms, called  and .
. This probabilistic algorithm takes a biometric information   ∈  as input and then outputs a secret key data   ∈    and a public reproduction parameter   , where        ,   .
. This deterministic algorithm takes a noisy biometric information   ′ ∈ and a public parameter   and   related to   , and then it reproduces (recovers) the biometric key data   . In other words, we have   ,       provided that the condition    ,   ′  ≤  is satisfied.
Registration phase
In Lin et al.'s scheme, the registration phase consists of two sub-phases, i.e. the user registration phase and the server registration phase. In this phase, the user and the server should register themselves to the registration center  and obtains the secret information to initial the system. User registration phase. The user must first register to the registration center  if they want to access any services provided by the registered servers. Therefore, the user   first chooses an identity   and a password   , and imprints his/her biometric information   at the sensor device to obtains          . Then, the user   sends the registration request message   ,        ,   to the registration center  over a secure channel. The registration center  hence computes:
The registration center  stores the information    ,   ,   ,   , ･,    into the smart card and sends the smart card to the user   via a secure channel.
Server registration phase. When a server wants to provide some service to the public, then it has to first register itself to the registration center . The server sends a registration request along with its identity   to the registration center . In return, the registration center  replies with    and   through the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [17] . The server uses these secrets to authenticate any registered user.
Login phase
The user   must first login to a specific terminal using smart card   . The user inserts his/her smart card into the card-reader and inputs his/her identity   , password   , and imprints the biometric information   ′ at the sensor with fuzzy extractor, and obtains
The smart card   then executes the following sequence of operations.
(1) The smart card   computes   ′      ,   ′      ′ , and verifies whether   ′ is equal to   or not. If failure occurs, the login phase is immediately aborted. Otherwise, the following steps are executed.
(2)   generates a nonce   and computes:
(3) Lastly, the smart card   sends the login request message   ,   ,    to the server   over a public channel.
Authentication phase
After receiving the login request message, the server   and the user   performs the following steps to authenticate each other and agree on a session key.
(1)   computes:
and whether   ′ is equal to   . If they are not equal, the session is terminated by the   .
Otherwise, the validity of   is authenticated by the server, and   performs the following steps.
(2)   generates a nonce   and computes:
and sends the response message    ,    to the user   .
(3) When receiving the response message   ,   , the   computes:
and checks whether   ′ is equal to received   .
If they are not equal, the session is rejected.
Otherwise, the   is authenticated by the server   , and they are share a common session key       at last.
Password change phase
If the user wants to change his/her password, it can be done without informing the registration center. After checking the entered information such as the identity   , password   and imprints the biometric   at the sensor with fuzzy extractor and obtains   from the (1) An adversary  can be either a user or server. A registered user can act as an adversary.
(2) An adversary  can eavesdrop on every communication across public channels. He/she can capture any message that is exchanged between a user and a server.
(3) An adversary  has the ability to alter, delete, or reroute a captured message.
(4) Any information can be extracted from the smart card by examining the power consumption of the card.
Outsider attack
Any adversary   who is the legal user and owns a smart card obtain information    ,   ,   ,   , ･,    , and then he/she can compute     ⊕   . Thus, an adversary   can get  which same for each legal user and is the hash value of pre-shared key of the servers.
Stolen smart card and off-line identity guessing attack
If an outsider adversary   steals the smart card of legitimate user   and obtains the parameters   ,   ,   ,   , ･,    , then he/she can perform an off-line identity guessing to get the current identity of the user   .
(1) The adversary calculates      ⊕ .
(2) The adversary then selects a random identity    , computes       and compares it with   .
If the result is equal to   , the adversary infers that    is the identity of the user   . Otherwise, the adversary selects another identity nominee, and then performs the same processes, until he/she locates the valid identity. (2) The adversary then calculates: (3) After computing parameters, an adversary   sends the login request message to the server   over a public channel for authentication.
Violation of the session key security
If an outsider adversary   intercepts all of the communication message between user   and server   , and steals the smart card of legitimate user   , he/she then obtains all of the messages    ,   ,   ,   ,    and the parameters    ,   ,   ,   , ･,    ; furthermore, he/she can get the value   , and also easily compute the session key between user   and server   . The details are described as follows:
(1) The adversary   computes:
(2) After computing the parameters, an adversary   can easily obtain the common session key            .
The proposed scheme
In this section, we propose a new biometric-based three factors user authentication scheme for multi-server environments. Lin et al. used the fuzzy-extractor technique [15] . We also adopted the same technique to protect user's biometrics, which can also counter a high number of false rejections that therefore decreases the probability that service access is denied [18] . The proposed scheme consists of the following four phases: registration, login, authentication, and password changing.
Registration phase
In our scheme, the registration phase consists of two sub-phases as same as Lin et al.'s scheme, i.e. the user registration phase and the server registration phase. In this phase, the user and the server should register themselves to the registration center  and obtains secret information to initial the system. User registration phase. The user must first register to the registration center  if they want to access any services provided by the registered servers. Therefore, the user   first chooses an identity   and a password   , and imprints his/her biometric information   at the sensor device to obtains         . Then, the user   sends the user registration request message  ,            to the  over a secure channel.
The  then computes,
Server registration phase. When a server wants to provide some service to the public, then it has to first register itself to the registration center . The server sends a registration request along with its identity   to the registration center . In return, the registration center  replies with  and   through the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [17] . The server uses these secrets to authenticate any registered user.
Login phase
The user   must first login to a specific terminal using smart card   . The user inserts his/her smart card into the card-reader and enters his/her identity   and password   , imprints the biometrics   ′ at the sensor, and obtains   ′    ′    using the fuzzy extractor.
The smart card   then performs the following sequence of operations.
(1) The smart card   computes   ′      ,   ′      ′ , and checks whether   ′ is equal to   or not. If this does not hold, the   immediately rejects the login request; otherwise, the following steps are executed. 
Authentication phase
When receiving the login request message, the server   and the user   performs the following steps to authenticate each other and agree on a common session key.
(1)   first computes:
and whether   ′ is equal to the received   . If this does not hold, the   terminates this session;
otherwise, the   authenticates the user   , and performs the following steps.
(2)   generates a nonce   and computes: ･,   .
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we demonstrate that our scheme, which retains the merits of Lin et al.'s scheme, can withstand several types of possible attacks, and we also show that our scheme supports several security properties. The security analysis of the proposed scheme was conducted under the following four assumptions.
(1) An adversary  can be either a user or server. A registered user can act as an adversary.
(3) An adversary  has the ability to alter, delete, or reroute a captured message. (4) Any information can be extracted from the smart card by examining the power consumption of the card. 
Functionality and performance analysis
In this section, we evaluate the functionality the computational costs comparisons between the proposed scheme and the other related schemes. Table 2 lists the functionality comparisons of the proposed scheme with the other related schemes. The table shows that the proposed scheme achieves all of the security and functionality requirements and is more secure than the other related schemes. 
Functionality analysis

Performance analysis
